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THROWING AWAY THE KEY: LIMITS ON THE
PLENARY POWER?
FELIX MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED ExILES TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS:
CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S., 1959-1995. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996. xii + 168 pp. AND MARK S. HAMM, THE
ABANDONED ONES: THE IMPRISONMENT AND UPRISING OF THE MARIEL BOAT
PEOPLE. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995. xv + 235 pp.
Reviewed by Richard A. Boswell*
CUBAN MIGRATION: EXAMINING THE LANDSCAPE
In the spring of 1980, at the same time that the United States Congress
enacted the Refugee Act of 1980,' the Carter Administration began
admitting a large number of refugees from Cuba under its parole
authority This occurred despite the fact that Congress, by enacting the
Refugee Act, expected to both change the way that refugees were admitted
into the country and limit the role of politics in their admission.3 The
arrival and subsequent treatment of these Cuban refugees in America
highlight the consequences of allowing politics to dominate what
essentially must be a humanitarian act.
* Professor of Law and Director, Immigrants Rights Clinic, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. J.D., George Washington University (1979); B.A., Loyola-
Marymount University (1975).
1. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 93 Stat. 102 (1980).
2. The statute in existence at the time provided as follows:
The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B), in his
discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he
may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of
such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes
of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the
alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was
paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner
as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1980).
3. One of the stated intentions of the Refugee Act was to limit the use of parole as a way
of dealing with refugee admissions as it had been used in past cases such as the admission of
Hungarians in 1956 and Cubans in 1959. Instead of invoking the Refugee Act of 1980, the
President used the parole power which had specifically been criticized when Congress enacted
the Refugee Act. See Pub. L. No. 96-212, 93 Stat. 102 (1980). Ultimately, the President created a
separate status termed "Cuban-Haitian Status" to deal with the admission of the refugees. See
Exec. Order No. 12,341, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1983).
4. At its core, refugee and asylum law are governed by humanitarian principles which
extend far back in history. See KAREN MusALo, Er AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1-56 (1997). Indeed, one of the stated purposes in enacting the Refugee Act of
1980 was to divorce asylum decisions from politics. See I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
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Two important books by scholars from different disciplines
chronicle the plight of the Cuban refugees who came to the United
States in the spring of 1980 in what has become variously known as the
"Freedom Flotilla" or "Mariel Boatlift." From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal
Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995 by Felix Masud-
Piloto5 and The Abandoned Ones: The Imprisonment and Uprising of the
Mariel Boat People, by Mark S. Hamm,' attempt to tell the untold stories
of the Cubans who came to the United States in the Freedom Flotilla.
They are accounts of the complex forces which propelled the Cubans to
come to the United States in the first place and how a small number of
the original group of 117,000 came to face indefinite detention in U.S.
prisons, which led many of them to riot out of frustration with the
conditions of their confinement. From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal
Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995 provides a
historical background of the Freedom Flotilla; The Abandoned Ones:
The Imprisonment and Uprising of the Mariel Boat People describes in a
very graphic and personal way the plight of the Cuban refugees who
ended up languishing in U.S. prisons because of their unique status
under U.S. immigration law.7
While the takeover of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana precipitated
the Freedom Flotilla, Professor Masud-Piloto makes it clear that the
initial groundwork for this exodus was laid as far back as the last century
and was exacerbated in modem times by U.S.-Cuban relations. Although
the precise details which led to the takeover of the Peruvian Embassy in
Havana by nearly ten thousand refugees may never be fully documented,
the political and legal drama which unfolded has had repercussions for
nearly two decades. For some, the event underscored the perception that
the United States had lost control of its borders. For others, it
highlighted the problems of vesting unlimited powers in the political
branches. For still others, it was a reminder of the need for a humane
asylum system in which the role of politics would be minimized.
The takeover of the Peruvian Embassy took some time before it
reached a type of critical mass. In the early 1980s, there had been
numerous incidents where Cubans sought asylum by entering the
(1984); Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: The Legislative History of
the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981).
5. FELIX MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED ExILEs TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS: CUBAN
MIGRATION TO THE U.S., 1959-1995 (1996).
6. MARK S. HAMM, THE ABANDONED ONES: THE IMPRISONMENT AND UPRISING OF
THE MARIEL BOAT PEOPLE (1995).
7. As discussed infra at notes 15, 32-51 and accompanying text, the Cubans face the
prospect of being forever incarcerated because they remain unadmitted aliens in exclusion;
there is no place for them to be deported as Cuba will not accept their return.
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grounds of Latin American embassies." The incident at the Peruvian
Embassy began when six Cubans who had crashed through the gates of
the Peruvian Embassy and killed a Cuban guard were granted asylum.
Cuban authorities requested that the Peruvian government turn the six
Cubans over for prosecution, but the request was refused. In response,
the Cuban government announced that anyone who wanted to leave
Cuba could go to the Peruvian Embassy. As a result of the
announcement, nearly ten thousand people overran the embassy grounds
within a three day period.9
The incident at the Peruvian Embassy was born out of the frustration
experienced by many Cuban citizens in attempting to take to the sea in
makeshift vessels or being arrested in the process of attempting to find a
way off of their island nation.'0 Indeed, throughout Latin America this
form of protection, known as "diplomatic asylum," has been frequently
8. For a more extensive discussion of the events leading up to the takeover of the
Peruvian and other embassies, see MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 5, at 78-83. Seeking
protection by entering the grounds of a foreign embassy is known as "diplomatic asylum"
and is common in Latin America. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
9. For a chronicle of the events beginning with the takeover of the Peruvian Embassy to
the beginning of the boatlift, see Richard A. Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion: The Rights of
Cuban Refugees Facing Indefinite Detention in the United States, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 925, 928 n. 13 (1984)..
10. It should be pointed out that the issue of whether the Cubans were legitimate
refugees is not without controversy. While Professor Masud-Piloto does not directly deny
their refugee status, he points out that the Cubans were merely fleeing from the economic
dislocation brought about by the economic boycott and conflicts with the United States. See
MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 5, at 92-100. I believe that it is a mistake to paint the Cubans
with such a broad brush. Clearly, with any group of refugees, there will be some who do not
have meritorious claims. At the same time, however, the Cuban government under Fidel
Castro was not without its share of human rights abuses. Those who did not go along with the
economic and political policies or who engaged in activities such as private enterprise were
treated as anti-revolutionary. Moreover, in defense of the revolution, "Block" committees
monitored these so-called "anti-revolutionary" activities to ensure that they did not go
unpunished.
While the level of discontent in Cuba may have subsided from where it was in 1980,
efforts by Cubans to leave the country have not ended. Some examples are the steady flow of
boats of asylum seekers landing in Florida and efforts to gain entry into the U.S. military base
at Guantanamo Bay, located on the eastern side of the island. See, e.g., Cuban Refugees
Rescued off Florida Sent Home, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 3, 1997, at A8; Coast Guard
Returns Cuban Rafters, THE MIAMI HERALD, July 24, 1997, at B2; Generous Partyers on
Ship Pick Up Cuban Refugees, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 22, 1997, at A6; 10 Cuban
Refugees Picked Up on Grassy Key, THE MIAMI HERALD, July 3, 1997, at B6.
11. These refugees were asserting a right long recognized by many Latin American
nations as "diplomatic asylum," which is defined as the assertion of protection of another
nation by entering its diplomatic mission. See GUY S. GOODWiN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (2d ed. 1996). This assertion of protection, while never having
been formally accepted by the United States, has been honored in isolated cases such as those
involving the Soviet "refuseniks" who were granted temporary refuge at the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow in the early 1980s. See Convention of the American States on Diplomatic Asylum,
Mar. 28, 1954, 5 Pan Am. Union Conferences & Org. S. 39, 53; Major John Embry
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used. On entering the grounds of the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, these
refugees captured the world's attention with their simple plea to be
allowed to leave their island nation. Some of these refugees were former
political prisoners, others were dissidents and others were branded as
anti-socials because they had found ways to resist the rigidity of the
Castro."2
Unbeknownst to the people who entered the Peruvian Embassy, as
well as to anyone at the time, their effort to leave Cuba would be
transformed into what would later be known as the "Freedom Flotilla" or
the Mariel Boatlift. In the days and months that followed, thousands of
refugees would leave Cuba, with some traveling to countries as far away
as Spain and Peru but the largest portion of them coming to the United
States.13 In the earliest stages of the boatlift, there was much elation
Parkerson, Jr., U.S. Compliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting Civilians During
Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 133 (1991); Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The Status
and Rights of Refugees Under International Law: New Issues in Light of the Honnecker
Affair, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 351-57 (1994). As a general principle the United
States does not recognize diplomatic asylum. See, e.g., Marian L. Nash, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1981)
(noting that the stated purpose of U.S. policy was to grant only "temporary refuge for
humanitarian reasons in extreme or exceptional circumstances, when a person's life or safety
is perceived to be in immediate and active danger"). This form of asylum has never been
favored by the United States, perhaps because of the potential of widespread invocation and
the resultant lack of control of the political consequences.
12. While it is difficult to put a precise label on all of the people who were part of the
takeover of the Peruvian Embassy, it is safe to say that the problems encountered by Cubans
at the time were well-known and documented by human rights groups. The United States had
often cited the Cuban government as a violator of the rights of its own citizens. In the period
immediately preceding the occupation of the Peruvian Embassy, the U.S. had been
"repatriating" Cuban political prisoners who had engaged in the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961
or committed other acts against the Cuban government. See CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE
BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS, SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM 185-220 (1988). In the annual reports of Human Rights Watch, Cuba has
consistently figured as a subject for criticism. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD
REPORT 1996: EVENTS OF 1995 85-90 (1995); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT
1990: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY
ON HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE 140-46 (1991).
13. To this day there are no accurate accounts of the number of Cubans and Haitians
who eventually came to the United States during this period. Estimates range from 117,000 to
131,000. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1218, 3-4 (1980). The lack of precision in ascertaining
the numbers of refugees who were admitted to the U.S. is not a unique phenomenon of the
1980 Cuban migration but has been the experience in other situations as well. In the period
preceding the passage of the 1986 immigration reform legislation, the Immigration &
Naturalization Services (INS) provided wide ranging figures of the numbers of
undocumented persons in the U.S. While providing accurate numbers is neither the focus of
the books reviewed here nor of this review, the agency's ability to deal with its mandate has
been the subject of never ending consternation for a series of administrations for decades. See
PANEL ON IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (U.S.), IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS: A STORY OF NEGLECT 87 (Daniel B. Levine et al. eds., 1985); Immigration
Statistics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Census and Population of the House Comm. on
Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 44-53 (1985) (statement of Jeffrey S.
Passel, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce).
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within the Cuban-American community in Florida. Over time, however,
as family members from the United States traveling to Cuba to bring
back loved ones began encountering difficulties as they were forced to
return with others besides their family members who wished to leave,
they became disillusioned with the boatlift. Eventually, the mood
concerning the boatlift would shift and take on a more negative tone
with many characterizing members of the Freedom Flotilla as criminals
or mental patients. This characterization, however, has never been
substantiated."'
While most of these refugees would find their way to the United
States and eventually be settled with their families or sponsors, some of
them would be held and continue to be kept in "detention" facilities in
various parts of the country. 5 In fact, their detention continues to be
upheld by the federal courts and is not subject to serious judicial scrutiny
because many of these refugees are still treated as if they were seeking
legal admission to the United States. 6 Even those who are permanent
residents can still be subject to remand to Immigration & Naturalization
Services (INS) custody should they commit any of the numerous acts
that might render them removable.'7 In short, the Cubans face a status
problem since citizenship is the only status that will protect them from
14. In fact, if one were to assume that the number of criminals represented by refugees
in the boatlift was the equivalent of the number of those in jail (approximately 2,500 of the
total of 117,000), this would represent a smaller proportion of criminals than exist in the
general U.S. population which is 3%. See Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Youth,
Family and the Law: Defining Rights and Establishing Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 177, 195
n. 94 (1996).
15. Initially, those arriving were processed at centers in Florida, but as the numbers
increased, so too did the resultant difficulties in detaining large numbers of persons in
fenced-in areas. They were, therefore, moved to military bases in places such as Wisconsin,
Arkansas, Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico. It became nearly impossible to determine the
numbers of detained Cubans or the reasons why they were detained. Generally, the Cubans
were placed in detention either because their sponsorship broke down or because they were
considered to be in a category of persons who were ineligible for release because of past
crimes in Cuba. Others who were in the community might again be detained by INS if they
committed a crime. See HAMM, supra note 6, at 53-57 (1995); See also Richard A. Boswell,
RETHINKING EXCLUSION, supra note 9, at 950-52 (1984).
16. The term "serious" judicial scrutiny is used here because the only review which the
Cubans may seek on account of their confinement is habeas corpus. However, because they
are deemed aliens seeking admission, the scope of judicial review is limited to whether the
INS's decision to deny or revoke parole is arbitrary. See also infra note 12 and accompanying
text. Since the parole decision is wholly discretionary, limited only. by the INS regulations,
the possibility of relief is minimal.
17. Those who have managed to become permanent residents should be able to avail
themselves of greater protections as they can claim that they have entered the U.S. and are
therefore protected under the Constitution. It should be pointed out, however, that the law is
not clear as to whether a Cuban permanent resident who commits one of a set of so-called
"aggravated felonies" may be detained without release even though there is no country to
which she may be deported. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226c, 1251 (1994).
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the possibility of detention in the future. Their plight is not generally
known by the American public which is only periodically reminded of
the Cubans' predicament when there is some disturbance in the form of a
protest or riot which breaks out at one of the prisons where the Cubans
are being kept.9
As Professor Masud-Piloto makes clear, the circumstances which
laid the groundwork for the Freedom Flotilla were predictable. The
Freedom Flotilla was not the first large-scale Cuban migration to the
United States. Castro's rise to power was followed by the flight of a
large number of the ruling class, and in later years, there were "airlifts"
which occurred from 1965 to 1973 allowing even more Cubans to come
to the United States.0 During the spring, of 1980, there was growing
unrest in Cuba due to shortages of food and consumer goods. Cuban-
Americans who had regular contact with their families in Cuba often
brought American dollars as well as the economic advantages of life in
the U.S. during their visits. Finally, the youth who had not grown up
under the Batista government were growing increasingly impatient with
the revolution's promise of future prosperity.
Forces in the United States also made a large-scale migration more
likely. The U.S. had long complained of the restrictionist emigration
policies of Cuba and other communist countries. For many years, Cuban
immigration was substantially lower than the actual number of people
who were eligible to immigrate because of emigration restrictions.2
Cuban-Americans and Cubans who were lawful permanent residents in
the U.S were anxiously hoping to bring over their family members who
18. However, it is important to note that those who are now in detention are ineligible to
solve their problem and may forever be confined to this limbo status for they are both
ineligible for admission and further, are ineligible for permanent residency or citizenship.
19. Indeed, Professor Hamm chronicles the unsynchronized yet nearly simultaneous
takeover of prisons by Cubans in Oakdale, Louisiana and Atlanta, Georgia.
20. See MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 5, at 58-61. The airlift brought in approximately
277,000 persons over an eight year period. According to Professor Masud-Piloto, during the
period from 1959 to 1960, 10,000 Cubans sought asylum; during the period from 1961 until
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, approximately 153,000 persons were admitted from Cuba;
during the three year period from 1962 to. 1965, approximately 29,000 Cubans were admitted
into the United States.
21. Under the immigration quota system in existence while there was a world-wide
annual quota of 270,000, no more than 20,000 could immigrate from any one country in a
single year. Immigration to the United States requires a family or employment within the U.S.
Generally speaking, family-based immigration requires that the person wishing to immigrate
must either be the spouse, parent, child or sibling of a U.S. citizen or be the child or spouse of
a lawful permanent resident. The employment-based immigrant must be sought by an
employer in the U.S. for an occupation where no willing and qualified U.S. worker is
available for the position. See RICHARD A. BOSWELL & GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO,
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 325 (2d ed. 1992).
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were living in Cuba. 22 Finally, 1980 was an election year and President
Carter was facing a foreign policy crisis in Iran and political opposition
from within his own party as well as from the Republican front-runner,
Ronald Reagan. These elements when combined created the perfect
climate for events to spin out of control and eventually did cause a large-
scale migration.
U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
United States involvement in Cuba and Cuban migration to the
United States can be traced back to well before Cuba's war of
independence from Spain. America's concern for and involvement
throughout the Caribbean Islands and Latin America was born out of
their proximity and strategic importance. U.S. involvement in Cuba
included three military interventions between 1906 and 1920 and
political intervention in the period which followed until Castro's
takeover in 1959.23 From an immigration perspective, Cuban migrants
have been coming to the United States to escape political turbulence
since the 1800s.
The period following the revolution in 1959 has been extremely
hostile, marked by U.S. efforts to topple the Castro government and
Soviet efforts to place troops and missiles on Cuba. Immigration and
particularly asylum policy were viewed as part of the overall foreign
policy efforts against the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence.
Emigration on one side and granting of political asylum was encouraged.
Indeed, the arrival of each political refugee from the Soviet Bloc was
viewed as a reaffirmation of the validity of our own system.2' Similarly,
the Freedom Flotilla was viewed as a blight on the Cuban revolution and
a validation of our foreign policy. In addition, for the Cuban refugees,
22. Special provisions had been enacted to accommodate Cubans who managed to get to
the United States. For example, the Cuban Adjustment Act provided that any Cuban who was
paroled into the country could seek permanent resident status within one year of their arrival.
See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966). In turn, other
provisions under the immigration laws allowed a permanent resident to apply for citizenship
after she had resided in the U.S. for five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1994). Due to not only the
fact that many Cubans had come to the U.S. in the early 1960's and were now citizens and
wanted to be reunited with their family in Cuba, but also the fact that emigration from Cuba
had been restricted for so many years, established the demand for immigration.
23. See MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 5, at 7-17.
24. There is no doubt that foreign policy and political considerations were a significant
force in U.S. asylum and refugee policy throughout the Cold War. Indeed, until 1965 asylum-
type protection was specifically accorded to persons fleeing from communist countries. See
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911 at 913
(1965).
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their journey was a logical extension of their unhappiness with the
revolution.
In one sense, events surrounding Cuban migration to the United
States and the history of relations between the two countries is a window
into many aspects of U.S. immigration law in the twentieth century. In
another sense, they reflect some of the more unfortunate trends of
immigration law as we move into the next millennium. While there is a
great deal that could be said about immigration through the Cuban-
American experience, I will focus on but a few of these important and
critical areas: the exclusion conundrum, the revival of detention as an
instrument of immigration policy, and the issue of race in immigration
law. I believe in the end that these issues are interrelated and connected
by race and that an exploration of the racial issue is finally necessary.
Discussions about Cuban refugees, especially those who came in the
period following the Cuban revolution, have always been a particularly
sensitive and politically charged subject. The view from the political
left" has been that many of these refugees are essentially economic
migrants because of their disagreement with the communist system.
Moreover, these people were fleeing a government which itself had been
engaged in a struggle for self-determination as well as stresses due to a
prolonged boycott by the United States. At the same time, the Cuban
revolution was in many ways a vast improvement over the corruption
and severe inequalities of pre-revolutionary regimes.26 As viewed from
the political right, the Cuban government was a Soviet-controlled
communist dictatorship, which illegally expropriated property and
engaged in extensive human rights abuses.
The purpose of this review is not to engage in the political debate
about the merits or demerits of the Cuban revolution, but to highlight
how this ideological division contributed to the predicament of the
Cuban refugees who came in the Freedom Flotilla. On one hand these
refugees were fleeing a country which was known to persecute segments
of its population and on the other hand the United States viewed this
refugee crisis as an embarrassment which reflected on its policy towards
Cuba." To be sure, immigration policy vis A vis Cuba had been
25. While it is always dangerous to reduce political characterizations to simplistic
notions of "left" and "right" politics, here the labels are used in general terms to more easily
present these political positions.
26. As chronicled by Professor Masud-Piloto, these earlier regimes were either
established or controlled by the United States since the earliest days of Cuba's independence
from Spain. See generally MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 5.
27. See, e.g., Human Wrongs: Grading the Behavior of Others, TIME, Feb. 21, 1983, at
18; Gilles Trequesser, U.N. Human Rights Team to Tread New Ground in Cuba, Reuters
Library Report, Sept. 15, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuters File; Press Group
[Vol. 18:689
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dominated by the politics of the Cold War which sought any opportunity
to publicly embarrass Cuba. This meant that the United States would
accord special treatment to Cuban asylum seekers. While the treatment
of refugees from non-communist countries was generally worse in that
the likelihood of receiving asylum was significantly lower, few of these
refugees faced the prospect of indefinite detention because in most cases
there were other places where they could go.
The Freedom Flotilla can be viewed from two very different
perspectives. One way to look at the boatlift is to see it as a political
historical event with a significant impact on U.S. immigration policy.
Another way to look at the boatlift is as an event which is instructive
about the complex of forces driving immigration policy as well as the
deep problems to be found in it. Masud-Piloto's book views the event
from its historical perspective in order to provide insight into how the
Cuban refugees could on one hand be viewed as heroes in the war
against communism and on the other hand be deemed pariah and
outcasts within their new country. Hamm's book examines the refugee
crisis from the point of view of the penologist concerned with the issue
of incarceration of non-penal detainees. In my opinion, what appears to
be missing from both Masud-Piloto's and Hamm's explorations is a
fuller appreciation of the larger legal issues and problems of
immigration law and policy.
U.S. courts have heretofore been unwilling to recognize any
substantive rights to persons arriving in the United States. Rather, they
are deemed to be "aliens in exclusion" and are thus permitted to be
confined in detention indefinitely." Prior to the large scale migration of
Cubans in 1980, detention was used almost exclusively on Haitian
refugees." Beginning with the arrival of Haitians in the period preceding
the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, the United States government initiated a policy
Blasts Cuba for Arrests of Rights Activists, Reuters, Aug. 10, 1989, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Reuters File; Cuban Rights Violations Growing Worse, Monitoring Group
Says, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1992, at C23.
28. There have been only slight deviations from this pattern by the courts. One case in
the Tenth Circuit held that customary international law required that the detained Cubans be
released. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). In another
case, U.S. District Court Judge Shoob held that the detentions without hearings on parole
release violated the Cubans' rights, a decision which was later reversed by the Eleventh
Circuit. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F2d
576 (11th Cir. 1984). In another case, a Ninth Circuit panel in a decision by Judge Noonan
held that these detentions were no longer immigration confinement but were punishment, a
decision which was later reversed by the court en banc. See Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 21
F.3d 314 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en banc, 44 F.3d 1441, (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 479 (1995).
29. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A
Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075 (1996).
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of detention on an unprecedented scale which had not been seen since
Ellis Island closed in 1954. This policy has continued to expand and to
become formalized in the statutory framework of the immigration laws.
Since the earliest days of U.S. immigration restrictions, racial exclusion
and exclusionary policies have been the backdrop of nearly all
immigration enactments.30
As chronicled by the authors, the story of the Cubans who sought
refuge at the Peruvian Embassy and the large-scale refugee migration
resulting from the takeover is not yet complete, for many of these
refugees remain in INS custody in various prison facilities located
throughout the United States. However, the treatment of the Cubans, the
legal limbo in which many of them languish, and their incarceration has
become the paradigm or model for the treatment of refugees under U.S.
policy. At the same time, the experience of the Cubans remains unique;
many of their Haitian brothers and sisters who fled the brutal Haitian
regimes of the time have been returned to their persecutors. The Cuban
refugees instead were not wanted by their own country. They were in
essence like stateless persons, with the nation in which they sought
refuge deciding that it was better to keep them away from the rest of
society.
The problem confronting the detained Cuban refugees highlights
what is wrong with general immigration law and policy. The conundrum
of the absence of legal rights which the Cubans could marshal on their
own behalf stretches back more than one hundred years to judicial
acquiescence in matters involving persons who had managed to legally
enter the country but who were deemed inadmissible. The indefinite
detention faced by Cuban refugees deemed "inadmissible" has been
further confounded by the dramatic shift in immigration policy which
began to favor detention over release.
In an odd way, the experience of the Cuban refugees is marked by
the very elements which in the past served to protect them: both politics
and foreign policy, two factors which were intended to be removed from
the consideration of asylum protection when Congress enacted the
Refugee Act in 1980. The Cuban experience provides a commentary on
who chooses to come to the United States, the circumstances under
which people come, and the peculiar way in which the larger public
views the new arrivals. Finally, a thorough discussion of the plight of
30. See generally Jan C. Ting, "Other than a Chinaman": How U.S. Immigration Law
Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REv. 301 (1995); see also Esther Rosenfeld, Fatal Lessons: United States
Immigration Law During the Holocaust, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249, 265 (1995).
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these refugees must address their race, a factor which has been a major
force in immigration policy since the founding of the United States and
continues to play a major role in the entry conundrum.
THE ENTRY CONUNDRUM
In a line of cases originating with the infamous Chinese Exclusion
cases,31 passing through the 1953 case of Shaughnessy v. Mezei 32 and
continuing on into cases decided more recently by the Supreme Court, it
has become well settled that in order for an "alien" to be accorded any
modicum of constitutional protection she must first have made an entry
into the United States. Not included within the ambit of constitutional
protection are persons who apply for admission and are allowed into the
country under what is termed "parole" status. The parolee is deemed to
be a person seeking admission irrespective of his physical location as
long as he has not been formally admitted to the U.S. This legal fiction
which revolves around whether the person is deemed to be inside or
outside of the U.S. for purposes of the Constitution raises the problems
encountered by the Cuban refugees facing indefinite detention. For if
these refugees had been considered "persons" within the United States,
they would not face arbitrary or prolonged detention even if they had
been convicted and served out a criminal sentence or if they were
considered to have a psychological condition necessitating their
detention. The government simply would have been required to release
them after they had served their sentences because there was no prospect
of their ever being deported since they could not be sent back to Cuba.
This "oddity" of immigration law has been universally criticized by
a legion of scholars for some time.33 Yet at the same time, courts dealing
with the issue have steadfastly refused to recognize limitations on the
31. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
32. Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
33. See, e.g., Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion, supra note 9; Henry J. Friendly, "Some
Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296-97 (1975); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 1362, 1392-96 (1953); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the
National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 173-80 (1983);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After A Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Michael
Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 965 (1993); Peter
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984); Margaret H.
Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the
Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 1087 (1995).
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plenary power doctrine or more specifically to restrict the power to
indefinitely detain excludable aliens . In only one circuit has a court
accepted the argument that indefinite detention could be restricted?5
Indeed, the only way in which unadmitted aliens have been able to gain
release is to show that the INS failed to properly exercise the parole
power delegated to it by Congress? Thus far, Cubans facing indefinite
detention have been unable to successfully argue that the effort to
continue their detention was not part of the immigration power. For
while the power to control immigration may be plenary, when the
government is not operating under this rubric, the courts have been
willing to restrict its actions.
DETENTION AND CONDITIONS OF TREATMENT
Beginning in 1980, U.S. immigration policy took a decided shift
towards detention. Indeed, recent legislation and INS practice mandate
detention in more situations than at any other time in the history of this
country. Detention has reached such high levels in recent years that in
addition to operating its own facilities, the INS has contracted with
municipal, county, state and even private corporations to operate its
detention centers." With the increased use of detention as a way of
34. See, e.g., Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103-4 (4th Cir. 1982); Gisbert v. U.S.
Atty. Gen., 988 F2d 1437, 1441-43, amended by 997 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'g Ramos
v. Thornburgh, 761 F Supp. 1258, 1260 (W.D. La. 1991); Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F2d
956, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'g 746 F Supp. 1006, 1014-15 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Amanullah
v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1987); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F2d 1478, 1484 (1 1th
Cir. 1985); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F2d 576, 582 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Jean v. Nelson,
711 F2d 1455, 1465-67 (11th Cir. 1983), affd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985);
Rodriguez v. Thornburgh, 831 F Supp. 810, 813-14 (D. Kan. 1993); In re Mariel Cuban
Habeas Corpus Petitions, 822 F Supp. 192, 196 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Pena v. Thornburgh, 770 F.
Supp. 1153, 1159 (E.D. Tex. 1991); Tartabull v. Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp. 145, 148 (E.D. La.
1990); Barrios v. Thornburgh, 754 F Supp. 1536, 1542 (W.D. Okla. 1990); Sanchez v. Kindt,
752 F Supp. 1419, 1427-32 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
35. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). In a later
case, a Ninth Circuit panel held that such detention was authorized under the statute. Barrera-
Echavarria v. Rison, 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd and remanded, 44 F3d 1441 (9th Cir.
1995), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 479 (1995).
36. For example, in one case, the petitioner was able to gain release upon a showing that
his parole had been revoked improperly. Moret v. Karn, 746 F2d 989 (3d Cir. 1984).
37. One example of a private facility which received attention was the Esmor Detention
Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, which erupted in a riot in June, 1995, after detainees
complained of gross abuses by the guards. See David Gonzalez, Jail Uprising Leaves Many
Sad and Biter, N.Y. TiMEs, Jun. 25, 1995, at 27, 30; Elizabeth Llorente, Esmor Probe
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dealing with the "immigration problem" has come a growing number of
complaints by refugees and advocates about a wide range of issues
related to detention as an extension of the immigration power.'
Whether a person is detained at a location outside of the United
States, in a far away place such as Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, or
at a facility in a remote location in Pennsylvania, significant issues are
raised. One of these issues is access to legal representation. When a
person who has representation is moved from one facility to another, that
representation may effectively be broken off because of the transfer. The
rules of access and limitations on access may also vary from facility to
facility with counsel finding it difficult to represent or communicate with
her client. The physical conditions within the facility, the general
treatment of the "detainees" and access to adequate medical care, food
and other necessities have also become the subject of much controversy.
In The Abandoned Ones: The Imprisonment and Uprising of the
Mariel Boat People, Professor Hamm presents in graphic detail the daily
life and conditions of the Cubans who were held in Atlanta, Georgia and
Oakdale, Louisiana. In particular, he focuses on the conditions in
Atlanta, a prison which the Bureau of Prisons had planned to demolish
until space was needed to accommodate some of the members of the
Freedom Flotilla. Professor Hamm describes the conditions which led to
a takeover of the prison by the Cubans, ranging from overcrowding to
gross physical abuse. As was noted by a congressional committee which
inspected the penitentiary before the takeover of the prison:
The current living situation for Cubans in the Atlanta Federal
Penitentiary is intolerable considering even the most minimal
correctional standards. These detainees-who are virtually
without legal rights-are worse off than virtually all other
Federal sentencing inmates. They are required to live in
conditions which are brutal and inhumane. They are confined
without any practical hope of ever being released. These
conditions ... present a strong possibility of future violent
confrontations. For these reasons alone, Congress and the
Administration should be motivated to seek out a constructive
solution. 9
Verifies Abuses: Paves Way for Closing Center, THE RECORD, Jul. 21, 1995, at Al; Michael
Schuman, What a Riot, FORBES, Aug. 14, 1995, at 12, 16.
38. For an excellent discussion of the detention issue and the law relating to the
detention of foreigners who are either attempting to enter the country or are facing removal
after entry, see Taylor, supra note 33.
39. HAMM, supra note 6, at 89, quoting ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY, 99th CONG.,
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON COuRTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
OF THE COMMrTIEE ON THE JUDICIARY (1986).
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These types of conditions have resulted in at least three major riots by
detained Cuban refugees, including the simultaneous taking of a facility
chronicled in The Abandoned Ones: The Imprisonment and Uprising of
the Mariel Boat People.4°
In recent years, the INS has been confronted with serious problems
not unlike the complaints lodged by Cuban detainees at the Bureau of
Prison facilities. Detainees have endured abuses ranging from strip
searches to beatings by guards to other violations of their basic rights. It
is also not unusual for INS detainees to be moved from facility to facility
where the conditions vary widely. As noted by one commentator, the law
in this area is very unclear and not well-developed.4' Persons within the
custody of the INS may not avail themselves of Eighth Amendment
protection because the INS detention is civil not criminal.4 2 Although the
Supreme Court has never decided the issue, those who have entered the
U.S. may be able to claim protection by way of the Fifth Amendment.43
However, conditions of confinement claims by aliens who have yet to
enter the U.S. are not at all clear because of the plenary power doctrine
which apportions constitutional rights only to persons considered to have
"entered" the country."
The central and more important question is what can be learned
from this experience. The legacy of detention as a key part of U.S.
immigration policy in the past was the eventual closing down of Ellis
and Angel islands. The legacy of the present, as a result of widespread
use of detention as part of immigration policy, has thus far yielded
complaints of abuse and other problems commonly found in prisoner
rights cases. Surely, as detention is used with increasing regularity and
40. See HAMM, supra note 6, at 155-181. See also Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 21 F.3d
314 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd and remanded, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 479 (1995).
41. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 1148-55.
42. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666-68 (1977). In Ingraham, the Court held
that corporal punishment in the public schools was not protected by the Eighth Amendment
"cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition, noting that the prohibition was restricted to
criminal punishment. Id. Moreover, the Court specifically cited to immigration cases for the
proposition that the imposition of immigration sanctions such as deportation were civil and
not criminal in nature. Id. at 668, citing Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Mahler
v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
43. In Reno v. Flores, the Court side-stepped the issue, choosing to characterize the
detention of unaccompanied minors as being in "[i]egal custody." 507 U.S. 292, 298 (1993).
The Court held in Bell v. Wolfish, a non-immigration case, that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment was the appropriate vehicle for asserting condition of confinement claims
of pre-trial detainees. 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979).
44. For a more elaborate discussion of the rights of persons in exclusion as it relates to
condition of confinement cases, see Taylor, supra note 33, at 1091-97.
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for longer periods of time, the courts will be called upon to deal with the
question of whether the detention has been transformed to a point where
it is more akin to punishment than to a legitimate exercise of the
immigration control power.45 As detention becomes more widespread,
another question which will certainly arise is the minimal level of
adequate treatment called for both under domestic as well as
international law.
The treatment of the members of the Freedom Flotilla was only
unusual because for the first time Cuban refugees were encountering
some of the same problems that refugees from other countries had
encountered. In the past, Cubans were rarely detained and were paroled
into the community in short order, receiving lawful permanent resident
status within a one year period.
It may very well be that when historians look back at this period in
immigration law, they will consider it as the nadir, just as scholars
described the famous exclusion cases of the 1950s as reflecting the low
point in the treatment of immigrants. Ironically, while the period of the
1950s has been described by some as the low point, the decisions
rendered by the Supreme Court in that period continue to provide the
underpinnings for virtually every immigration policy and act put into
place since the enactment of the first immigration laws.46 That principle
is that a nation may do whatever it pleases when it comes to those
seeking admission, and that in this regard there is no court which should
interfere with the policies except when the agency is acting as an outlaw.
Even if agency action plainly violates its statutory mandate and thus
45. In the case of the Cuban refugees, this point is particularly relevant, for the effect of
a life sentence on someone who has already served out his criminal sentence can be
devastating. Professor Hamm describes the many suicides which have occurred among the
Cuban refugees in prison. HAMM, supra note 6, at 92.
46. The now infamous case of Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), which upheld
the permanent exclusion of an immigrant. even though no country would accept his return,
and the earlier case of Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), which upheld the
retroactive application of deportation grounds to persons who had already been admitted,
relied upon the previously established plenary power doctrine. In the Mezei case, the Court
repeated the famous pronouncement that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress
is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned" Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212,
quoting Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). The foundation for the plenary
power doctrine was established in an earlier decision by the Court in Chae Chan Ping v. U.S.,
130 U.S. 581 (1889) (Chinese Exclusion Case), where the Court upheld the exclusion of
Chinese laborers from the United States. These cases in turn provided the underpinning for
the Court's recent decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, permitting the forcible return
of Haitian asylum seekers, notwithstanding the Refugee Act's prohibition of returning
persons to countries where their life or freedom would be threatened. See Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 175 (1993); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994).
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opens itself to judicial review, the 1996 amendments to the Immigration
and Nationality Act preclude judicial review. Oddly, the notion that a
country can do whatever it pleases out of the reach of the judicial branch
is an idea which in most of the world has fallen into disrepute. In
Europe, for example, the European Human Rights Convention has been
interpreted as prohibiting both the forcible return of persons" to
countries where they might be persecuted as well as the long term
detention of persons who could not be deported. 9 European courts have
thus interpreted international law as providing some restrictions on state
power. Moreover the recognition of this limitation on state power has not
been viewed as a terribly frightening prospect portending the end of their
notions of sovereignty."
In a recent Supreme Court decision involving Haitian asylum
seekers, where U.S. officials were forcibly returning the refugees to their
persecutors without hearings, the Court held that the Refugee Act neither
applied to persons outside of the United States nor did it control the
actions of U.S. officials outside of the country.'
47. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 306(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 607-12 (1996), (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252) (provides
for limited review of agency decisions). Indeed, in other areas such as when persons are
denied admission because they are believed to be in possession of false documents or
fraudulently obtained documents, they are entitled to neither a hearing nor any judicial
review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1994).
48. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 E.H.H.R. 413, 414 (1997).
Specifically, Article 5 para. I(f) of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits the
deprivation of a person's liberty unless the person has been convicted of a criminal offense.
Such a deprivation is only warranted to the extent that it is necessary to effect the removal of
an "unauthorized" foreigner who is seeking admission or has entered the country. Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5,
para. I(f), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sep. 3, 1953).
49. Paul W. Butler & David L. Gregory, A Not So Distant Mirror: Federalism and the
Role of Natural Law in the United States, the Republic of Ireland, and the European
Community, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 440-45 (1992); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
50. There have been some concerns regarding the abrogation of state sovereignty but
this has revolved around questions on trade and monetary controls, not issues involving
immigration. To be sure, the European nations are concerned about immigration, however,
this has not yet devolved into a demand that individual nations can ignore principles of
international law in their immigration policy.
51. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial
Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in
Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1
(1993).
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RACE AS AN ISSUE IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Perhaps it can be said that the two driving forces of U.S.
immigration policy since the founding of the nation have been race and
politics. These two forces, when coupled with the unique judicial
deference accorded in immigration matters to the legislative and
executive branches of government, have allowed for a largely unfettered
and politicized immigration legal scheme. It is not surprising, therefore,
that Cubans would be admitted in large numbers during the period
between 1959 and 1965 and greeted with greater hostility in 1980.
Cuban migration in the earlier period was comprised mostly of
professional and white or lighter skinned immigrants, while more of
those who came in the latter period were mulatto and fewer of an
identifiable professional class.5
Immigration questions are inextricably bound up with notions of
identity. This is no less true when one is discussing family, employment
or refugee-based migration. For inevitably when we think about
immigration issues, we are contemplating whom we will welcome as
part of our community. 3 In the United States, the question of
52. It is interesting to note that the author did not comment on the racial breakdown of
the Cuban members of the Freedom Flotilla. Although there seems to be little information
with a precise breakdown of the Cubans who came in the boatlift, according to one source
Cuba is 51% mulatto, 37% white, 11% black and 1% Chinese. See CUBAN AMERICAN
NATIONAL FOUNDATION, CUBA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, IN CUBA'S TRANSITION 145
(1992). One commentator, in discussing some of the problems in a post-Castro Cuba,
emphasizes that the Cuban exile community in the United States is "overwhelmingly white
and represented the professional class in pre-Castro Cuba:' Stuart Grider, A Proposal for the
Marketization of Housing in Cuba: the Limited Equity Housing Corporation-A New Form of
Property, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 453, 465 (1996). Recent news stories have
revealed the racial tensions within the Cuban-American community. See Alfonso Chardy,
"Invisible exiles": Black Cubans Don't Find Their Niche in Miami, HOUST. CHRON., Sept. 12,
1993, at A24; Mireya Navarro, Black and Cuban-American: Bias in 2 Worlds, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1997, at A7 ("Sociologists here say one reason that whites have overwhelmingly
predominated in the exodus from revolutionary Cuba in the last 38 years is that the first
waves of immigrants consisted mainly of the white elite who then sponsored relatives into the
United States. And many blacks stayed behind longer because they had supported a
revolution that provided social gains, opening educational and professional opportunities
previously denied them, even if it had not extended equally to leadership positions in
government'").
53. Indeed, the report by the President's Commission created after the enactment of the
controversial McCarran-Walter Act in 1952 was titled "Whom We Shall Welcome."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL
WELCOME: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION 131 (1953). It might be said that we are entering a time in which many of
those whom we traditionally welcomed are being shut out. Evidence of this can be seen in the
efforts at drawing wider distinctions between permanent residents. These efforts intend to
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immigration has at its core always been one involving race. The first and
most blatant evidence of this can be seen in the discussions of the
meaning of the citizenship of slaves born in the United States.?
Additional evidence of the racial issue can be seen in the legislation
enacted during the last century which extended into the twentieth
century to exclude Asians from citizenship and residency.5 Indeed, at the
heart of the discussion of immigration creating our present immigration
statute were matters of race and a concern that the identity of the nation
was shifting from a Northern European stock to a Southern European
stock5 6 Curiously, while race has been a driving issue in the formulation
of immigration policy, it has been the perennial unaddressed issue.
U.S. immigration law can be characterized by two levels of racial
exclusion, one in which there were blatant racial exclusionary statutes
and the other by more insidious policies of governmental actions and
less official acts of state and federal discrimination against immigrants.57
An example of the official exclusions which were codified as part of the
immigration statutes is the Chinese Exclusion Act. Similar insidious
discriminatory policies can be found in the efforts to return Haitian
refugees, or the World War II denial of admission of Jews who were
fleeing persecution at the hands of Nazi Germany. On another level,
limit access to a variety of benefits to citizens of the United States. Other efforts have been
proposals to limit citizenship even to certain persons born in the United States. See, e.g.,
H.R.J. Res. 56, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 705, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1363, 104th Cong.
(1995) (proposed constitutional amendment and legislative changes which would limit
citizenship to persons born in the U.S. of one U.S. citizen parent or legal resident). None of
these proposals have been enacted.
54. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
55. See generally BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850-1990 (1993); CHARLES GORDON Er AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 2.02 (1997).
56. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993) (chronicling extensive state efforts at restricting immigrants);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding illegal a San Francisco ordinance
precluding Chinese immigrant from engaging in laundry business); 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv.,
Prop. 187 (West) (California Ballot Proposition 187 enacted in 1994 sought to restrict access
to public benefits before Congress enacted its own restrictions in the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996); Daniel R. Gordon, The State
Constitutionalism of Social Exclusion and Subordination: Stepping Back in Florida, 69
TEMP. L. REv. 1041, 1042-48 (1996) (describing efforts in Florida to impose restrictions on
immigrants); Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 939, 954-60 (1995) (describing numerous efforts by states to restrict non-
citizens access to employment, contracts, education, and other benefits).
57. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans,
37 How. L.J. 237 (1994); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism:
Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55 (1996).
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throughout our history, there have been various state and local
enactments focused on various immigrant populations. In this regard,
few groups have been spared victimization either by local governments
or the existing population at the time.58
This reluctance to deal with the racial issues in immigration is also
reflected in the treatment of the Mariel Cubans. The first major Cuban
migration which came during the early years of the Castro government
brought to the United States a group of people who represented for the
most part the educated professionals and the ruling class and who were
for the most part of European ancestry. While their coming to the United
States was not totally not without controversy, they were able to blend
into the majority culture and establish themselves. The members of the
Freedom Flotilla, however, were of a notably different class and racial
origin. In fact, these new immigrants were not the same as their fellow
citizens who had come some twenty years earlier.59 This distinguishing
characteristic, while obvious, has not been the subject of discussion in
most of the literature relating to the plight of these people. This is ironic
because one of the central complaints in litigation and scholarly
discussion of Haitian refugees has been the question of racial
exclusion. 60
One analysis of the plight that befell the Cubans who arrived as part
of the Freedom Flotilla was that they were caught between the twin
forces of race and politics. First, for the most part, those who arrived in
the Flotilla and were subsequently incarcerated were overwhelmingly of
Afro-Cuban origin, a matter that has been largely ignored by most
writers on the subject of the Freedom Flotilla.6' It had long been the
58. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR:
CIvIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 7-12 (1980) (detailing historical discrimination in
U.S. immigration laws).
59. This phenomenon is probably not unique to Cuban immigrants. For while the new
immigrants in many ways share much of the same culture and speak the same language, they
are not the same as those who came at an earlier time. Surely, the earlier arrivals have become
more "American" and are a little less Cuban.
60. See, e.g., Ellen B. Gwynn, Race and National Origin Discrimination and the Haitian
Detainee, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 333 (1986); Thomas David Jones, The Haitian Refugee
Crisis: A Quest for Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 77 (1993); Malissia Lennox,
Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the United States' Haitian Immigration
Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687 (1993); Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: the
Plight of Haitians Seeking Political Asylum in the United States, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 841
(1994).
61. Professor Masud-Piloto spends a great deal of time discussing the economic
background of these Cubans and describes them as products of the Revolution, unlike the
Cubans who arrived when Castro took over who were, for the most, part professionals such as
doctors and lawyers. See MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 5, at 92-100.
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belief of refugee advocates that U.S. asylum policy was weighted against
darker skinned people and in favor of persons fleeing communist
regimes of eastern Europe. As mentioned above, the most notable
example of this bias in policy was seen in the treatment of Haitian
asylum seekers who sought refuge in the 1970s and 1980s. A lesser
known example was the plight of Ethiopians and Eritreans who sought
protection during the extensive civil war in that region. Perhaps it was
coincidental, but it was also during this same period that the INS began
shifting its policy towards to one which favored detention.
CONCLUSION
For the most part, the Cuban refugee crisis of 1980 was a successful
resettlement effort. The total numbers of persons who came to the U.S.
from Cuba numbered approximately 117,000 and by August of 1980,
slightly more than 14,000 remained in INS custody. By June of 1982, the
numbers were reduced substantially to between 1,300 and 2,000 persons.
However, the persons who remain in detention, even if they are not U.S.
citizens, are human beings deserving of some protection. The
government's position has been that they are entitled only to be free
from malicious infliction of cruel treatment or "gross physical abuse." 2
Unless the legislative, executive or judicial branch deal with the
remaining issue of indefinite detention, the refugee crisis will continue.
There will be more riots in the prisons and more lives will be damaged.
One of the more serious side-effects of the longstanding Cuban-
American political conflict was its effect on U.S. asylum policy. This
occurred even though one of the explicit purposes in enacting the
Refugee Act of 1980 was to eliminate politics from the process. There is
a danger in allowing politics to drive determinations of asylum
questions. Human rights violations may be perpetrated both by a
nation's political friends as well as her foes. Who is to say that a staunch
ally of the United States, Egypt for example, does not perpetrate
discrimination and persecution against members of its Coptic Christian
population? Is it any less likely, that a political foe such as China is not
the perpetrator of human rights violations against its dissidents? It is,
therefore, no less likely that Fidel Castro engaged in persecution of his
own citizens, or that Baby or Papa Doc would do the same to his
62. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 1092; Medina v. O'Neill, 838 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir.
1988); Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.5 (2d Cir. 1990).
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citizens."3 As has been seen throughout history, both our friends as well
as our foes may be inclined to violate the human rights of their citizens.
If the granting of asylum protection is treated as a humanitarian act, it
might very well help to preserve its integrity. The politicization of the
process invites the adjudicator to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations which will result in thwarting the very purpose of the law.
The debate about whether a country may indefinitely detain an
excluded individual is really about where the immigration power begins
and ends. Scholars who have wrestled with this question choose to
characterize the issue as a clash between the plenary power doctrine and
alien rights jurisprudence. Another way to look at this issue is by adding
a concept of ultra vires to the analysis. This explains why there are
certain actions which are not permissible even though they involve aliens
who have yet to enter the country.
Much of the analysis of the entry conundrum has been based on the
false premise that the power to exclude extends into the indefinite future
even when exclusion is not possible. There are a set of fact situations
which point out the limit to the notion of the plenary nature of the
exclusion power. If we were to take several examples of situations in
which aliens in exclusion were subjected to the judicial process, we
would readily recognize that constitutional rights existed even for the
alien to be excluded. An example of this would be the alien in exclusion,
who is accused of the commission of a crime in an INS detention center.
The second situation is that of a Cuban refugee in parole status against
whom a tort is committed or who wishes to sue for breach of contract. In
each of these situations, U.S. courts would not distinguish the person
because of her immigration status. In the criminal case, the defendant
would be entitled to the full protection of the Constitution since the
matter involves a crime and the potential deprivation of the person's
liberty.' In the second case, both the alien tort plaintiff or tortfeasor who
alleges breach of contract would be given full access to the courts.
The important question to ask is why it is that the defendant in a
criminal case or the plaintiff or defendant in a civil action is treated no
differently than any U.S. citizen or resident. The answer to the question,
63. In this respect, I would disagree with the characterization by Professor Masud-Piloto
that those who came in the Freedom Flotilla were economic migrants as compared to the
Haitian refugees who came at the same time. While it is unfortunate that the United States
politicized the situation by refusing to acknowledge that the government which it supported
persecuted its own people, to do so with the Cuban refugees is equally improper. Asylum
should be decided without invoking a political agenda.
64. U.S. v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 913 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Casimiro-Benitez,
533 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Moya, 74 F3d 1117, 1119 (1 th Cir. 1996).
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I believe, is found in the nature of the power which is being asserted. In
the criminal case, it is the power of the state acting to punish an
individual and deprive her of her liberty because of a crime which may
have been committed. In the civil case, it is one individual seeking
redress against another with the assistance of the judicial process. These
actions can be clearly distinguished from removal of the alien because
they have no significant connection to the immigration power. Finally,
when considering the end to be served by preserving the plenary nature
of the power into the indefinite future, the interest diminishes over time.
This is the type of approach taken by courts in recognizing some limit on
the power to detain indefinitely. Indeed, even courts which have been
unwilling to recognize these limitations agree that if the court believed
that punishment was involved in the detention it could be a violation of
the person's rights.65
It seems that one cannot discount the impact of race in trying to
understand the enigmatic issue of the plenary power. Certainly, there are
other factors such as national identity which fuel the concern for
protecting the borders. While the calls for immigration controls subsided
during the period before and following World War II, it was only in 1952
that the Asian exclusion provisions were finally removed. 6 In 1965,
Congress eliminated the national origin quota system, a system which
had been designed to maintain the racial composition of the United
States in existence at the turn of the century.67 The period following the
end of the Vietnam War saw the first major influx of Asians to the
United States. A larger number of Filipinos with post-colonial and
World War II ties to the United States also began to immigrate. U.S.
involvement in the Korean War also encouraged increased migration
from that country. Political turmoil or civil wars in Afghanistan, Iran and
Central America in later years brought additional refugees to the United
States." The immigrant population during this period until the present
was not the traditional white European migration to which the United
65. See Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (finding that the punishment of
aliens for their illegal immigration status was unconstitutional); Franco-de Jerez v. Burgos,
876 F.2d 1038 (1st Cir. 1989). In Cruz-Elias v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 870 F Supp. 692, 697 (E.D.
Va. 1994), a district judge, while not finding in the particular case that indefinite detention
amounted to punishment, speculated that punishment would not be legal.
66. The Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-477, § 212, 66 Stat. 163
(1952).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1952), amended by Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
68. It should be pointed out that the United States had significant political and military
involvement either by propping up the governments of these countries or destabilizing them.
In short, U.S. foreign policy interests were involved and being furthered.
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States had been accustomed. Legislation enacted in 1986, 1990 and 1996
began to place increasing restrictions on immigration, making it easier
for the government to remove lawful permanent residents and restricting
their access to public benefits. 9
The public mood is decidedly anti-immigrant even though
immigration to the United States is less than it was at the turn of the
century. This political mood is certainly not lost on the Executive or the
Congress which has increased the use of detention as a part of U.S.
immigration policy. This combination of the public's anti-immigrant
mood and the broad discretion accorded by the judiciary to Congress and
the Executive in matters which they choose to characterize as related to
immigration reinforce the continuing vitality of indefinite detention.
Ultimately, the inability of the judicial branch to divorce the practice of
indefinite and inhumane detention from the plenary power doctrine has
resulted in the ultimate folly of the twentieth century immigration
jurisprudence.
69. In fact, the immigration legislation of 1986 attempted to facilitate the increased
immigration of Europeans to the United States through a program called the "diversity
lottery" BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 21, at 348.
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